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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.

\
1
1 Case No
i
f
14060
1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was
charged with interfering with a police officer. Said defendant pled not guilty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This action was appealed from the Justice of the
Peace Court, Milford Precinct, from a Judgment of the
Justice of the Peace, E. L. Smith, finding the defendant
guilty and said action was tried in Beaver County before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Honorable J. Harlan Burns and the jury returned a
verdict of guilty.
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was sentenced to six months in the Beaver County Jail and is
presently incarcerated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, seeks a vacation of the jury verdict and a judgment of not guilty
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury or in the alternative, a new trial, and an immediate order of release from
the Beaver County Jail.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard Allen Bradshaw was charged in the Complaint with the following:
Interference with arrest by law enforcement official in that the said Richard Allen Bradshaw intentionally interfered with the said Dennis B. Cox
in Milford City, Utah, while the said Dennis B. Cox
then being and acting as a law enforcement official
for Milford City was attempting to affect an arrest
of the said Richard Allen Bradshaw.
In the instant case the jury was presented with one
witness, a police officer for the City of Milford, named
Dennis B. Cox. Officer Cox testified that he was a police
officer for the city of Milford and had been for the two
years last past and that he knew Richard Allen Bradshaw
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and knew the address of Richard Allen Bradshaw" at the
time of the arrest (TR 5,6), Officer stated at trial that he
had a casual relationship with Mr. Bradshaw prior to the
15th day of March, 1974, which was the time of the arrest

(TR6).
On the 15th day of March,, 1974, Officer Cox testified.
that he was dressed in uniform and saw Richard Allen
Bradshaw driving a car down Main Street, whereupon the
officer turned on his red light and followed Richard Allen
Bradshaw to a Conoco Station in Milford, Utah (TR 6, 7).
The officer then testified on Page 7 of the Transcript:

A

•, after you followed him into the station,
then what happened?
I pulled up behind him. He left his vehicle and
started to put gas in it with the gas pump. At
that time I advised him that I had to write him
a citation for driving under suspension and he
finished his purchase of gas, went in and paid
for it and got in his vehicle and left while I was
writing the citation.

The officer also testified that he pulled up behind Mr.
Bradshaw and got out of his patrol car and that halfway
between his patrol car and the Bradshaw car the officer
advised Mr. Bradshaw that he would be written a ticket
for driving under suspension (TR 7). The officer also testified that he did not ask Mr. Bradshaw for his drivers
license nor did he ask Mr. Bradshaw to stay at the service
station and that the above set forth conversation was the
only conversation between Mr. Bradshaw and the officer
prior to the time Mr. Bradshaw left the service station (TR
12 ).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Officer Cox also testified that at, the time of the arrest
Richard Allen Bradshaw had a valid drivers license and
that he was not under suspension, nor had his license been
revoked (TR 13, 14).
The officer testified further that when Mr. Bradshaw
left the Conoco Service Station that he was followed to the
Milford Hotel where he was placed under arrest for interfering with an officer, apparently because he refused to
stay at the service station while the officer was writing a
citation.
The officer also testified that he cocked his pistol at
that time and pointed the gun at Mr. Bradshaw because he
was accused of driving on a suspended drivers license
which he later found out was not suspended (TR 15).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
TAKE THIS CASE FROM THE JURY AND
FIND THE DEFENDANT "NOT GUILTY" OF
THE CHARGE BECAUSE THE STATE DID
NOT CARRY ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST.
In the State of Utah peace officers are governed by
Section 77-13-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended),
which provides as follows:
77-13-3. By peace officers. — A peace officer may
make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered
to him; or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1) For a public offense committed in his presence.
(2) When the person arrested has committed a
felony, although not in his presence.
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believing the person to have committed a public offense,
although not in his presence, and there is reasonable cause for believing that such person before a
warrant can be obtained and served may:
(a) Flee the jurisdiction or conceal himself to
avoid arrest, or
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense, or
(c) Injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.
(4) When a felony has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to have committed it.
(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable cause,
of the commission of a felony by the person arrested.
(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause to
believe that he has committed a felony.
In the instant case, a public offense was not committed in the presence of Officer Cox and therefore, Officer
Cox did not have reason, justification, or probable cause
for the attempted arrest.
The arrest in the instant case does not fall under any
of the exceptions set forth above. Number 3 might seem
applicable at first glance, but under that exception, Officer Cox would not have to get a warrant if he had reason
to believe that the defendant would flee or conceal himself
to avoid arrest or destroy evidence or injure another person. The evidence indicates that Officer Cox knew the
defendant in a casual manner, knew where he lived and
this exception would not apply.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There was no justification for the arrest and the arrest was invalid, therefore, there can be no justification for
charging the defendant with interference as set forth by
the new Criminal Code.
The officer in the instant case did not have sufficient
probable cause to arrest or to detain this defendant. The
only testimony concerning probable cause was illicited on
cross-examination where the officer testified that he had
reason to know the license of Mr. Bradshaw had been
suspended, however, upon stopping the defendant, the
officer did not ask to see the drivers license nor did he
know whether Mr. Bradshaw had the license on his person, and there is no proof, even under the preponderence of
the evidence, that Mr. Bradshaw did not have his license
at the time the officer told him he was going to write him a
citation. The proof is to the contrary, as the officer admitted; that Mr. Bradshaw's license was valid and was not
suspended at the time of the arrest. Because there is no
probable cause for the officer to determine that a public
offense was committed in his presence, it is impossible for
the defendant to be charged with interfering.
In the case of State of Utah v. Lopez, 22 Ut.2d 257,451
P.2d 772 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an
officer must have probable cause before making an arrest
and probable cause is not satisfied merely by showing that
the officer acted in good faith, but the requirement of
probable cause does not mean that the officer has to be
sure he has enough evidence to establish guilt. In the
instant case there is no evidence of probable cause.
The California Supreme Court, in 1947, dealt with a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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problem similar to the problem we have here, only it
concerned the common law defense of resisting an unlawful arrest. That case isPeople v. Perry, 180 P.2d 465 (1947),
and the Supreme Court of the State of California held that
an officer may make an arrest for a misdeameanor without a warrant only if the offense is committed or attempted in the officer's presence and that an arrest must be
lawful or the person being arrested may use reasonable
force in order to resist.
Sometime later the legislature of the State of California passed a statute which is similar to the Utah Statute
involved here and t h a t statute was reviewed in the case of
People v. Albert Allen Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 173, 450 P.2d
33 (1969). The facts in t h a t case related to the legality of
the arrest whether or not there was probable cause, and
the Court found t h a t an officer is under no duty to make an
unlawful arrest and t h a t the officer did not have probable
cause. The Court then spoke to the statute dealing with
the right to resist and stated words to the effect t h a t a
statute providing that if the person has knowledge, or by
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, t h a t
he is being arrested by a peace officer and provides that it
is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon to
resist such arrest, is a statute meant at most to eliminate
common law defense of resisting unlawful arrest and not
to make such resistance a new substantive crime.
The Court went on to state that the defendant in that
case, who resisted the unlawful arrest, could only be convicted of assault or battery or whatever crime that he
actually participated in by resisting and could not be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

convicted of something caused by the statute concerning
resistance of arrest.
It is the contention of the defendant that the statute
under which he was charged does not say that there does
not have to be probable cause for the arrest, but only says
that there does not have to be a legal basis for the arrest.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of City
ofAlburquerque v. Leatherman, 74 N.M. 780,399 P.2d 108
(1965), stated that an arrest not justified by probable
cause could be resisted with reasonable force.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah dealt with
obstruction ofjustice in the case ofState v. Hurley, 28 U.2d
248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972), in which case the defendant
appealed a conviction stating that the officer was not
discharging any duty of his office so as to invoke the
statute concerning obstruction of justice. The Supreme
Court of the State of Utah found that the officer had no
interest in patrolling the area that he was patrolling and
therefore, the officer was not discharging a duty of his
office and did not invoke the statute. The same thing is
argued by the defendant in the instant case because the
officer was not performing or discharging any duty of his
office by giving someone a citation for driving under a
suspended drivers license when that defendant had a
valid drivers license. Therefore, the statute we are dealing
with should not be invoked to allow a new crime of resisting arrest.
The Supreme Court of California in the Curtis case,
supra, seems to be saying that if an officer makes a mistake and does not properly discharge his duty, then that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officer cannot make up for that mistake by arresting a
defendant unlawfully held for obstructing justice or interfering when that defendant does not submit peaceably to
the officer's demand.
The last case in the State of Utah which this writer
can find concerning obstruction of justice is State v.
Ludlow, 28 U.2d 434, 503 P..2d 1210 (1972). In the
Ludlow case, the officer charged the defendant with obstruction ofjustice because the defendant refused to bring
a female employee out of a certain factory so that she could
be served by the deputy sheriff in a small claims court
action. Because of such refusal, the defendant was arrested for obstructing an officer in the performance of his
duty and the District Court quashed the Information and
the State appealed. The judgment of the District Court
was affirmed.
In the instant case, the resistance, if it may be called
that, of this defendant, is certainly not more than set forth
under the facts of theLudlow case. The deputy in that case
may not have been acting legally in requiring the defendant to produce an employee and the officer in the instant
case was not acting legally in arresting the defendant for
something he had not done.
In the Ludlow case, the defendant simply refused to
conform to the demands of the officer and in the instant
case, the defendant simply refused to conform to the demands of the officer. Both cases are similar in many respects, but the instant case is even stronger when dealing
with the fact that the officer did not have probable cause to
make an arrest or perform any other type of police function.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
WAS VIOLATED.
The Utah Statute pursuant to which this defendant
was arrested states as follows:
Section 76-8-305. Interfering with arrest or detention.
A person is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor
when he intentionally interfers with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking to
affect an arrest or detention of himself or another
regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the
arrest.
It is defendant's contention that this statute was written in violation of Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.
Defendant also contends that the Utah Statute violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States of America.
The contention of the defendant is supported by Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) which states that there is a
seizure whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away. That case also states
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the Constitution does not forbid all searches and
seizures but only unreasonable searches and seizures.
Defendant contends that he has a constitutional right
against any unreasonable seizure. This right of defendant
is inconsistent with the statuteinacted by the Utah State
Legislature concerning interference with an officer, because the officer may make an arrest or a seizure under
that statute whether or not he has legal basis. The Utah
Statute is inconsistent with and violative of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the United States of America.
CONCLUSION
The statute relied on by the State in this case may
very well violate the Constitution of the State of Utah and
of the United States of America, and more than that, the
State has not shown probable cause for the detention of
this defendant.
Defendant was advised that he was to receive a citation for a suspended drivers license. Defendant left the
area and was therefore charged with interfering with an
officer. The State admits that the defendant had a valid
drivers license at the time he was stopped by the officer.
Defendant requests this Court to vacate the jury verdict and to find defendant not guilty as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL W. PARK
110 North Main Street, Suite F
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
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